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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Under both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Minnesota 
Rules of Civil Procedure, every claim for relief must contain “a short and 
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . 
.” 1  The notion behind this rule is that “[t]he complaint should put the 
defendant on notice of the claims against him.” 2  Exactly how much 
substantive notice does Rule 8 require that a defendant have?3 
According to a literal reading of the rule of law in Conley v. Gibson,4 
and the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Northern States Power Co. 
v. Franklin, 5  Rule 8 does not require much substantive notice at all. In 
Conley, the High Court held the following:  
 
In appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of 
course, the accepted rule that a complaint should not be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears 
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.6   
 
Similarly, in Franklin, the Minnesota Supreme Court held: “A claim 
is sufficient against a motion to dismiss based on Rule [12.02(e)] if it is 
possible on any evidence which might be produced, consistent with the 
pleader’s theory, to grant the relief demanded.”7 This liberal view of notice 
pleading limits the concept of “notice” to disclosing the theory of recovery, 
                                                 
 1  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.01. 
 2  Mumm v. Mornson, 708 N.W.2d 475, 481 (Minn. 2006) (citing L.K. v. Gregg, 
425 N.W.2d 813, 819 (Minn. 1988)). 
 3  See infra Part II (explaining how courts interpret Rule 8). 
 4  Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957). 
 5  N. States Power Co. v. Franklin, 122 N.W.2d 26, 29 (Minn. 1963). 
 6  Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46 (emphasis added). 
 7  Franklin, 122 N.W.2d at 29 (emphasis added). 
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providing enough information to permit application of res judicata, and 
advising whether a jury or bench trial is required.8 
Functionally, the Conley rule and the Franklin rule are synonymous.9 
Read literally, both rules describe the minimum standard of adequate 
pleading to govern a complaint’s survival in terms of what the plaintiff can 
prove. 10  The discovery process, not the quality of a complaint’s factual 
allegations, determines what the plaintiff ultimately might prove and what 
evidence the plaintiff ultimately might produce. 11  Therefore, literal 
application of both rules practically guarantees that a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim will be denied if it challenges a complaint’s factual 
substance.12 
Federal pleading and Rule 12 motion jurisprudence changed in 2007 
when the Supreme Court of the United States decided Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly.13 Twombly overruled Conley and redefined Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) 
in a way that requires every claim for relief to contain a minimal level of 
factual substance in order to survive a motion to dismiss.14 It held that a 
complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.”15 Without defining “plausibility” in any exact terms, 
the Court said that this plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege 
“enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal” 
evidence of alleged wrongdoing.16 Two years later, the High Court extended 
Twombly in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,17 holding that the plausibility standard applies 
to claims for relief in all federal civil actions.18 Both decisions hold that a 
complaint consisting of nothing more than legal conclusions or a formulaic 
recitation of a claim’s elements will not suffice to state an actionable claim 
for relief.19 Thus, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), every claim for relief must 
provide a minimal level of factual substance showing that the pleader is 
entitled to the demanded relief.20 
                                                 
 8  See id.; Roberge v. Cambridge Coop. Creamery Co., 67 N.W.2d 400, 402 
(Minn. 1954) (citing 2 MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 8.13 (2d ed. 1953); 1 
YOUNGQUIST & BLACIK, MINNESOTA RULES PRACTICE 193 (1953)). 
 9  Compare Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46 (holding that “a complaint should not be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can 
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief”) with Franklin, 
122 N.W.2d at 29 (holding that “a claim is sufficient against a motion to dismiss . . . if it is 
possible on any evidence which might be produced, consistent with the pleader’s theory, to 
grant the relief demanded”). 
 10  See Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46; Franklin, 122 N.W.2d at 29. 
 11  See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 
 12  See Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46; Franklin, 122 N.W.2d at 29. 
 13  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 
 14  Id. 
 15  Id. 
 16  Id. at 556. 
 17  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009). 
 18  Id. 
 19  See id. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 
 20  See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 
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Twombly and its progeny represent a profound change in pleading 
and Rule 12 motion jurisprudence which is impacting pleading and quite 
possibly Rule 12 motion practice in Minnesota’s state courts.21 Within the 
past four years, the Minnesota Supreme Court has cited Twombly twice for 
the proposition that legal conclusions do not bind courts charged with 
deciding whether a complaint states an actionable claim for relief.22 Yet the 
Minnesota Supreme Court has yet to explain what effect, if any, Twombly’s 
prohibition against pleading by legal conclusion has on the Franklin rule 
which, literally read, determines pleading sufficiency based on what the 
pleader ultimately might prove. 23  In Hebert v. City of Fifty Lakes, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court relied on Franklin to uphold the validity of a 
complaint alleging a counterclaim for continuing trespass, noting that the 
complaints in both cases contained factual allegations sufficient to state 
actionable claims under that theory.24 In Bahr v. Capella University, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court cited the Franklin rule as an accepted pleading 
standard. 25  In the same paragraph it cited Hebert and Twombly for the 
proposition that allegations consisting of mere legal conclusions do not state 
actionable claims.26  Yet Bahr also does not explain what effect, if any, 
Hebert (and Twombly) have on the Franklin rule. 27  Bahr analyzed the 
complaint at issue in terms of whether its facts stated a plausible claim 
without expressly adopting Twombly’s plausibility standard.28 
Consequently, these three decisions, Bahr, Hebert, and Franklin, 
present a paradox that must be resolved.29 On one hand, Bahr and Hebert 
essentially say that actionable claims for relief require factual substance in 
order to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.30 On the 
other hand, the Franklin rule, literally read, makes the viability of a claim 
depend on what the plaintiff ultimately might prove, as opposed to the 
                                                 
 21  See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Bahr v. Capella Univ., 788 N.W.2d 76, 80 
(Minn. 2010); Hebert v. City of Fifty Lakes, 744 N.W.2d 226, 235 (Minn. 2008); Lorix v. 
Crompton, Corp., 736 N.W.2d 619, 631 n.3 (Minn. 2007).   
 22  See Bahr, 788 N.W.2d at 80; Hebert, 744 N.W.2d at 235.  The Minnesota 
Supreme Court originally cited Twombly in Lorix v. Crompton, Corp., but only to observe that 
the High Court “recently opined on the minimum factual allegations that must be pleaded to 
support a claim of restraint of trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act.”  736 N.W.2d 619, 
631 n.3 (Minn. 2007). 
 23  N. States Power Co. v. Franklin, 122 N.W.2d 26, 29 (Minn. 1963). 
 24  See Hebert, 744 N.W.2d at 235–36. 
 25  See Bahr, 788 N.W.2d at 80 (citing Franklin, 122 N.W.2d at 29). 
 26  See id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Hebert, 744 N.W.2d at 235). 
 27  See Bahr, 788 N.W.2d at 80. 
 28  See id. at 82–85. See also infra text accompanying notes 294–297. 
 29  See infra Part IV (explaining the Bahr-Hebert-Franklin paradox and its 
solution). 
 30  See infra Part IV.B (describing how Bahr perpetuated the paradox Hebert 
created). 
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quality of the facts alleged.31 This contradiction is the Bahr-Hebert-Franklin 
paradox.32 
The Minnesota Supreme Court needs to resolve this paradox by 
formally adopting Twombly’s plausibility standard.33 Adopting that standard 
raises important considerations addressed in this essay. 34  Does the 
plausibility standard change the concept of notice pleading in unacceptable 
ways?35 If claims for relief must allege plausible facts, how should courts 
apply the plausibility standard?36 Should the plausibility standard apply to 
affirmative defenses as well as claims for relief?37 
As a template for addressing these considerations, it is necessary to 
examine Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), its interpretation under Conley, its 
transformation in Twombly, and its development and extension in Iqbal.38 
This examination reveals that the plausibility standard is but a larger, 
thematic trend in the way the United States Supreme Court views the 
function and purpose of dispositive motions.39 Against this backdrop we will 
examine how formally adopting the plausibility standard as the pleading 
requirement in Minnesota state courts resolves the Bahr-Hebert-Franklin 
paradox while accomplishing the over-arching purposes of the Minnesota 
Rules of Civil Procedure without diminishing the flexibility that modern 
pleading practice offers.40 
  
II.  HOW COURTS DEFINE A “CLAIM” FOR RELIEF 
DETERMINES THE EXTENT OF A PLEADER’S OBLIGATION 
UNDER RULE 8 WHEN STATING A CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
 
Both Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and Minn. R. Civ. P. 8.01 require every 
“claim for relief” to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .”41 How detailed the factual 
                                                 
 31  See infra text accompanying notes 260–264 (stating the rule set out in 
Franklin).  
 32  See infra Part IV (explaining the Bahr-Hebert-Franklin paradox). 
 33  See infra Part IV.D (explaining how the plausibility standard solves the Bahr-
Hebert-Franklin paradox). 
 34  See infra Part IV.D (explaining how the plausibility standard solves the Bahr-
Hebert-Franklin paradox). 
 35  See infra Part IV.D (explaining how the plausibility standard solves the Bahr-
Hebert-Franklin paradox). 
 36  See infra Part IV.D (explaining how the plausibility standard solves the Bahr-
Hebert-Franklin paradox). 
 37  See infra Part IV.D (explaining how the plausibility standard solves the Bahr-
Hebert-Franklin paradox). 
 38  See infra Part II–III (explaining the differing interpretations of Rule 12 in 
Conley, Twombly, and Iqbal).  
 39  See infra Part III.D (examining the plausibility standard). 
 40  See infra Part IV (explaining how the plausibility standard solves the Bahr-
Hebert-Franklin paradox). 
 41  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.01. 
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allegations need to be depends on how one defines the word “claim.”42 
Scholars and commentators have long debated what constitutes a “claim” for 
purposes of pleading.43 Twombly simply reignited that debate.44 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were supposed to simplify 
pleading practice.45 The common law pleader had to state facts according to 
the particular writ governing the case.46 Parties alleged facts according to 
what the writ required as opposed to what the pleader actually believed to 
have happened.47 Hence, common law pleading had more to do with keeping 
the case in court than providing real notice about what the claim involved.48 
Code pleading developed to remedy this shortcoming by requiring 
claims for relief to allege the actual facts of a dispute while making pleading 
short and simple.49 The Code required pleaders to provide a statement of 
“facts constituting a cause of action.”50 This requirement was supposed “to 
apprise the defendants of what the plaintiff relies upon and intends to 
prove.”51 Code pleading required the pleader “to set forth only the ultimate 
facts, free from evidentiary facts and conclusions of law.” 52  Yet the 
distinction between ultimate facts, evidentiary facts, and legal conclusions 
often was unclear, differed only by degree, and rightfully earned criticism 
from commentators.53 Justice William Mitchell aptly described the situation 
by stating the following: 
 
It is, of course, an elementary rule of pleading that facts, and 
not mere conclusions of law, are to be pleaded. But this rule 
does not limit the pleader to the statement of pure matters of 
                                                 
 42  See infra text accompanying notes 64–65 (discussing how courts define the 
word claim in a broad and narrow sense). 
 43  See 1848 N.Y. Field Code Laws ch. 379, § 142; JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY 
KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 248 (2d ed. 1993); Walter W. Cook, 
Statements of Fact in Pleading Under the Codes, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 416–19 (1921); Bernard 
C. Gavit, Legal Conclusions, 16 MINN. L. REV. 378 (1932); Clarence Morris, Law and Fact, 
55 HARV. L. REV. 1303 (1942); Carl C. Wheaton, Manner of Stating Cause of Action, 20 
CORNELL L.Q. 185 (1935). 
 44  See Charles B. Campbell, A “Plausible” Showing After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, 9 NEV. L.J. 1, 10 (2008). 
 45  Id.  
 46  FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 43, at 248. 
 47  See id. 
 48  See id.  
 49  See id. 
 50  1848 N.Y. Field Code Laws Ch. 379, § 142. 
 51  Baker v. Habedank, 277 N.W. 925, 926 (Minn. 1938) (citing Dechter v. Nat’l 
Council, 153 N.W. 742 (Minn. 1915)). 
 52  FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 43, at 249. 
 53  See id. at 249 (citing CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE 
PLEADING § 38 at 233–36 (2d ed. 1947); Walter W. Cook, Statements of Fact in Pleading 
Under the Codes, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 416–19 (1921); Bernard C. Gavit, Legal Conclusions, 
16 MINN. L. REV. 378 (1932); Clarence Morris, Law and Fact, 55 HARV. L. REV. 1303 (1942); 
Carl C. Wheaton, Manner of Stating Cause of Action, 20 CORNELL L.Q. 185 (1935)). 
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fact, unmixed with any matter of law. When a pleader 
alleges title to or ownership of property, or the execution of 
a deed in the usual form, these are not statements of pure 
fact. They are all conclusions from certain probative or 
evidential facts not stated. They are in part conclusions of 
law and in part statements of facts, or rather the ultimate 
facts drawn from these probative or evidential facts not 
stated; yet these forms are universally held to be good 
pleading.54 
 
The difficulty posed by the seemingly illusive distinction between ultimate 
facts, evidentiary facts, and legal conclusions often “left claimants mired in 
the same highly technical attention to detail present under the common 
law.”55 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure remedied this problem in the 
federal courts.56 Rule 8(a)(2) merely requires every claim for relief to contain 
“a short and plain statement of the claim” showing the pleader’s entitlement 
to relief without prescribing a particular form for pleading.57 If a claim for 
relief fails to comply with that rule, Rule 12 permits the district court to 
dismiss it as one failing to state a claim for which relief can be granted.58 The 
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure mirror the Federal Rules in this regard.59 
In order to understand exactly what Rule 8 requires of pleaders 
stating claims for relief, it is necessary to understand what the word “claim” 
means.60 Neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the Minnesota 
Rules of Civil Procedure define the word “claim” as used in Rule 8(a)(2) or 
Rule 8.01.61 The Minnesota Supreme Court has equated the word “claim” 
with the phrase “cause of action” by stating: “A cause of action, often 
referred to as a claim, is ‘[a] group of operative facts giving rise to one or 
                                                 
 54  Clark v. Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 9 N.W. 75, 71 (Minn. 1881). 
 55  Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Rational Pleading in the Modern 
World of Civil Litigation: The Lessons and Public Policy Benefits of Twombly and Iqbal, 33 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1107, 1116 (2010). 
 56  Simplifying the hyper-technicality of code pleading is but one problem the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure remedied. Before Congress passed the Rules Enabling Act in 
1933,  see 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (2012), the Conformity Act of 1872 governed federal district 
court procedure. See 17 Stat. 197; R.S. 914; 28 U.S.C. § 724 (1872). The latter legislation 
“required federal courts to apply the procedural law of the forum State in nonequity cases.” 
Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 501 (2001). Thus, to the extent 
state courts disagreed about what constituted appropriate pleading under the code, that 
disagreement would have carried over into the federal courts. 
 57  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 58  See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 59  See MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.01; MINN. R. CIV. P. 12.02(e). 
 60  See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 61  See FED R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); MINN. R. CIV. P. 801. 
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more bases for suing’ or ‘[the] legal theory of a lawsuit.’”62 Accordingly, one 
can understand the word “claim” in both a broad and a narrow sense.63 In the 
narrow sense, a “claim” refers to a group of operative facts giving rise to one 
or more theories of legal liability.64 In the broad sense, a “claim” means the 
legal theory alleged, such as negligence, strict liability, premises liability, 
etc.65 
What Rule 8 requires of pleaders stating claims for relief depends 
upon whether the court understands the word “claim” in the narrow or the 
broad sense.66 If the court understands the word “claim” narrowly, Rule 8 
requires pleaders stating claims for relief “to allege, if only in sketchy terms, 
the existence of circumstances that they had reason to believe were true and 
that, if true, would entitle them to relief of some kind.”67 It requires the 
following: 
 
[A] detailed narrative in ordinary language—one setting 
forth all elements of a claim under applicable substantive 
law. That is, the key would have been not that the complaint 
was to be above all “short,” but that it was to be above all 
“plain” and showing entitlement to relief as a matter of 
law.68 
 
Charles E. Clark, the principal architect of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, seemed to take that view when he wrote: “The prevailing idea at 
the present time is that notice should be given of all the operative facts going 
to make up the plaintiff’s cause of action, except, of course, those which are 
presumed or may properly come from the other side.”69 Professor James 
Wm. Moore put it this way: 
 
Perhaps it is not entirely accurate to say, as one court has 
said, that “it is only necessary to state a claim in the 
pleadings and not a cause of action.” While the Rules have 
substituted “claim” or “claim for relief” in lieu of the older 
                                                 
 62  Martin v. City of Rochester, 642 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Minn. 2002) (emphasis added) 
(quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 214 (7th ed. 1999)). 
 63  See id. 
 64  See id. 
 65  See id. 
 66  See infra text accompanying notes 67–79 (explaining the various 
interpretations court interpret the word claim). 
 67  FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE § 3.6, at 147 (4th ed. 1992). 
 68  Charles B. Campbell, A “Plausible” Showing After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, 9 NEV. L.J. 1, 9 (2008) (citing Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets are 
Hid, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1665, 1685 (1998)).  
 69  CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 2, at 240 (2d 
ed. 1947). 
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and troublesome term “cause of action,” the pleading must 
still state a “cause of action” in the sense that it must show 
“that the pleader is entitled to relief.” It is not enough to 
indicate merely that the plaintiff has a grievance. Sufficient 
detail must be given so that the defendant, and the court, can 
obtain a fair idea of what the plaintiff is asserting, and can 
see that there is some legal basis for recovery.70 
 
Similarly, the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii 
observed the following: 
 
[I]t seems to be the purpose of Rule 8 to relieve the pleader 
from the niceties of the dotted i and the crossed t and the 
uncertainties of distinguishing in advance between 
evidentiary and ultimate facts, while still requiring, in a 
practical and sensible way, that he set out sufficient factual 
matter to outline the elements of his cause of action or claim, 
proof of which is essential to his recovery.71 
 
Understanding the word “claim” narrowly obligates the pleader to allege 
facts with sufficient clarity and heft to allow the court and responding parties 
reasonably to infer the liability theories stated from the facts alleged.72 A 
claim for relief that fails to contain such factual allegations would merit 
dismissal as failing to state a claim for which relief could be granted.73 
Less of a pleader is required under Rule 8 when stating a claim for 
relief if the court understands the word “claim” broadly.74 In that situation, 
the facts alleged may not have to suggest any particular liability theory at 
all.75 Even the most general statement of operative facts would suffice to 
state an actionable claim for relief. 76  Legal conclusions without factual 
enhancement could suffice. 77  The discovery process would determine 
whether the legal theories raised ultimately were actionable.78 If discovery 
failed to reveal any facts in the form of evidence that might sustain the 
                                                 
 70  2A JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 8.13, at 1704–05 
(2d ed. 1975) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Mortensen v. Chi., Great W. Ry., 2 F.R.D. 121, 
121 (S.D. Iowa 1941)). 
 71  Daves v. Hawaiian Dredging Co., 114 F.Supp. 643, 645 (D. Haw. 1953). 
 72  See id. 
 73  See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 74  See Martin v. City of Rochester, 642 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Minn. 2002) (emphasis 
added) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 214 (7th ed. 1999)). 
 75  See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957) (defining “claim” in a broad 
sense); N. States Power Co. v. Franklin, 122 N.W.2d 26, 29 (Minn. 1963) (interpreting the 
word “claim” broadly). 
 76  See Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46; Franklin, 122 N.W.2d at 29. 
 77  See Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46; Franklin, 122 N.W.2d at 29. 
 78  See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 
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liability theories alleged, then summary judgment, not dismissal under Rule 
12, would dispose of the claim.79 
The United States Supreme Court evidently understood the word 
“claim” broadly when it stated the Conley rule.80 There it held the following: 
  
In appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of 
course, the accepted rule that a complaint should not be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears 
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.81   
 
The Minnesota Supreme Court evidently shared that understanding of the 
word “claim” when it stated the Franklin rule, Minnesota’s counterpart to 
Conley.82 There it held: “A claim is sufficient against a motion to dismiss 
based on Rule [12.02(e)] if it is possible on any evidence which might be 
produced, consistent with the pleader’s theory, to grant the relief 
demanded.” 83  The Minnesota Supreme Court apparently had the same 
understanding of the word “claim” when it decided First National Bank v. 
Olson, where it followed a liberal interpretation of the rule stating that “there 
is no justification for dismissing a complaint for insufficiency * * * unless it 
appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under 
any state of facts which could be proved in support of the claim.”84 
Thus, under Conley, Franklin, and Olson, a court would not use Rule 
12 to dismiss an action merely because the complaint’s factual allegations 
were vague, unclear, or lacking. 85  The Minnesota Supreme Court 
acknowledged this point in Franklin, saying that “a motion to dismiss based 
on [Rule 12(b)(6) or 12.02(e)] serves an extremely limited function.”86 About 
the only way the defendant could prevail on such a motion would be to show 
that the plaintiff was incapable of proving facts consistent with the facts and 
theories alleged.87 A neutral set of operative facts, such as facts failing to 
suggest any kind of actual wrongdoing, would never fail to state a claim 
because of the possibility that discovery might uncover evidence of actual 
wrongdoing consistent with the legal theories conclusively alleged.88 Thus, 
                                                 
 79  See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 80  Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46. 
 81  Id. (emphasis added). 
 82  Franklin, 122 N.W.2d at 29. 
 83  Id. (emphasis added). 
 84  First Nat’l Bank of Henning v. Olson, 74 N.W.2d 123, 129 (Minn. 1955) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Dennis v. Vill. of Tonka Bay, 151 F.2d 411, 412 (8th Cir. 1945)). 
 85  See Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46; Franklin, 122 N.W.2d at 29; Olson, 74 N.W.2d 
at 129. 
 86  Franklin, 122 N.W.2d at 29. 
 87  Id. 
 88  See id. 
10
Hamline Law Review, Vol. 36 [2013], Iss. 3, Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr/vol36/iss3/5
2013] BAHR-HEBERT-FRANKLIN PARADOX 447 
 
 
 
under Rule 12, motions to dismiss perform a very limited role when courts 
understand the word “claim” broadly.89 
Interestingly, the result in Conley would have been the same whether 
the High Court understood the word “claim” broadly or narrowly. 90  In 
Conley, African-American railroad workers sued under the Railroad Labor 
Act (“RLA”), claiming their union violated the RLA by failing to provide 
them with the same protection given to white employees.91 Specifically, the 
African-American workers alleged that their union failed to represent their 
interests when the railroad supposedly eliminated their jobs and subsequently 
filled the jobs ostensibly eliminated with white employees.92 Such operative 
facts clearly infer an RLA violation, even if one understands the word 
“claim” narrowly.93 Understanding the word “claim” broadly, as the High 
Court did in Conley, simply means that many other claims framed with even 
less factual detail could avoid a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim.94 
Similar observations follow from the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 
decision in Franklin. 95   That action involved the issue of whether a 
counterclaim alleging a continuing trespass stated a claim for which relief 
could be granted.96 It determined that the counterclaim stated an actionable 
trespass claim, not because the pleader characterized the claim as one for 
continuing trespass, but because the pleader had alleged facts sufficient to 
permit the district court and the parties to infer that a continuing trespass had 
occurred.97 Like the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Conley, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court in Franklin articulated a rule governing the 
sufficiency of pleadings and Rule 12 motion practice that was broader than 
necessary to accomplish the result in each case, essentially because each 
Court understood the word “claim” as used in Rule 8 broadly.98 
Why these Courts took the broad view of the word “claim” is a 
mystery.99 In Conley, neither the briefing nor the oral arguments focused 
heavily on the Rule 8 pleading requirements.100  Nothing in the Franklin 
opinion indicated that the parties had any fundamental disagreement about 
                                                 
 89  See id. 
 90  See infra text accompanying notes 91–93 (explaining how interpreting the 
word claim differently would not have changed the result in Conley). 
 91  See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 42–43 (1957). 
 92  See id. 
 93  See id. 
 94  See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 95  See N. States Power Co. v. Franklin, 122 N.W.2d 26, 28 (Minn. 1963). 
 96  See id. 
 97  See id. at 30–31. 
 98  See id.; Conley, 355 U.S. at 46–48. 
 99  The courts did not offer an explanation as to why they interpreted “claim” 
broadly. 
 100  See Emily Sherwin, The Jurisprudence of Pleading: Rights, Rules, and Conley 
v. Gibson, 52 HOW. L.J. 73, 89–92 (2008) (discussing the parties’ briefs and oral arguments in 
Conley). 
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what Minn. R. Civ. P. 8.01 required of pleaders.101 This mystery is, and 
perhaps always shall remain, a curiosity for historians and legal scholars. 
 
III.  THE PLAUSIBILITY STANDARD REPRESENTS A SHIFT 
FROM THE BROAD TO THE NARROW DEFINITION OF A 
“CLAIM” FOR RELIEF, MAKING RULE 12 MOTIONS AN 
INTEGRAL PART OF FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE 
 
Conley’s “no set of facts” rule guaranteed that for the next fifty years 
courts and lawyers understood the word “claim” as used in Rule 8 broadly 
and the concept of notice pleading as liberally permitting claims for relief to 
provide notice of the claim in only the most general terms.102 As a result, 
courts and lawyers generally paid little attention to the factual substance 
underlying claims for relief.103 That state of affairs changed abruptly when 
the Supreme Court of the United States decided Twombly in 2007, holding 
that claims needed to be substantively (as well as formally) sufficient by 
alleging facts giving rise to a plausible claim for relief.104 Two years later the 
High Court decided Iqbal, emphasizing that Twombly’s plausibility standard 
applied to claims for relief in all civil actions.105 Both of these landmark 
decisions show that the plausibility standard rests on the narrow definition of 
the word “claim.”106 
 
A. Twombly Changed Federal Pleading Practice by Imposing a 
Substantive Notice Requirement on Pleading. 
  
 Twombly involved a putative class action lawsuit alleging a violation 
of § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.107 That provision forbids the formation 
of a “contract, combination . . .  or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce.”108 The plaintiffs were consumers of telecommunication services 
who alleged that incumbent local exchange carriers (“ILECs”) engaged in 
parallel conduct whereby they agreed not to compete with one another.109 
This conduct allegedly had the effect of preventing competition by 
competing local exchange carriers (“CLECs”).110 But the complaint never 
actually alleged facts suggesting that the ILECs actually formed a contract, 
                                                 
 101  See Franklin, 122 N.W.2d at 28. 
 102  See Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46. The United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
Conley became binding precedent for other courts to follow. The Twombly decision abruptly 
changed the pleading standard in 2007. 
 103  See Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46 (stating the “no set of facts” rule).  
 104  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562–63 (2007). 
 105  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–81 (2009). 
 106  See id.; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562–63.  
 107  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 548. 
 108  Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004)). 
 109  Id. at 551.  
 110  Id. 
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combination, or conspiracy to restrain trade by refusing to compete in one 
another’s markets as CLECs.111 
 The district court dismissed the action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6) because “the behavior of each ILEC in resisting the incursion of 
CLECs is fully explained by the ILEC’s own interests in defending its 
individual territory.”112 It determined that the complaint failed to raise the 
inference that the ILECs’ acts resulted from a conspiracy because the 
plaintiffs failed to allege facts which suggested that such conduct was 
contrary to the ILECs’ apparent economic interest.113 
 The Second Circuit reversed, holding that the district court used the 
wrong standard to test the legal sufficiency of the plaintiffs’ complaint.114 
Although it acknowledged that the plaintiffs had to plead facts which 
“include conspiracy among the realm of ‘plausible’ possibilities in order to 
survive a motion to dismiss,” the Second Circuit ruled that “a court would 
have to conclude that there is no set of facts that would permit a plaintiff to 
demonstrate that the particular parallelism asserted was the product of 
collusion rather than coincidence” in order “to rule that allegations of parallel 
anticompetitive conduct fail to support a plausible conspiracy claim.”115 
 The United States Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit, 
holding that a complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief 
that is plausible on its face.”116 Justice Souter, writing for the majority, noted 
that parallel business behavior or even conscious parallelism is not unlawful 
and does not establish a conspiracy to restrain trade.117 Evidence indicative 
of nothing more than parallel conduct would not entitle a plaintiff alleging a 
Sherman Act violation to a directed verdict.118 Nor would such evidence be 
legally sufficient to avoid summary judgment by ruling out the possibility 
that the defendants were acting independently as opposed to being involved 
in a contract, combination, or conspiracy to restrain trade.119 
 From this, the Court reasoned, it followed that a complaint alleging a 
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act had to allege more than parallel 
conduct to state a claim for which relief could be granted.120 Under Rule 
8(a)(2) the complaint not only must amount to a short and plain statement of 
the claim, its factual allegations also must provide the grounds, or basis, for 
the pleader’s entitlement to relief. 121  The complaint must do more than 
provide mere labels, conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the cause of 
                                                 
 111  Id. at 552. 
 112  Id. 
 113  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 552. 
 114  Id. at 553. 
 115  Id. 
 116  Id. at 570. 
 117  See id. at 553–54. 
 118  Id. at 554. 
 119  See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554. 
 120  See id. at 554–57. 
 121  Id. at 555. 
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action’s elements.122 Its factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right 
to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all the 
allegations in the complaint are true . . . .”123 The pleader’s entitlement to 
relief must be facially plausible, meaning that, within the context of a 
Sherman Antitrust claim, the complaint must contain “enough factual matter 
(taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made.”124 
 In imposing factual plausibility as a pleading requirement under Rule 
8, the Court emphasized that “[a]sking for plausible grounds to infer an 
agreement does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it 
simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery 
will reveal evidence of [an] illegal agreement.”125 Whether a plaintiff can 
actually prove the existence of such an agreement is immaterial to deciding 
whether the complaint states a plausible set of facts. 126  The plausibility 
standard, held the Court, requires the pleader to allege facts suggestive of, 
not conduct merely consistent with, unlawful activity.127 
 The Court’s imposition of this plausibility standard on pleading 
clearly was motivated in large part by the expense of discovery in antitrust 
cases.128 The Court quoted its decision in Associated General Contractors of 
California, Inc. v. Carpenters, noting that “a district court must retain the 
power to insist upon some specificity in pleading before allowing a 
potentially massive factual controversy to proceed.”129 That consideration 
was particularly strong in Twombly, where the “plaintiffs represent[ed] a 
putative class of at least 90 percent of all subscribers to local telephone or 
high-speed Internet service in the continental United States, in an action 
against America’s largest telecommunications firms . . . .”130 
 Yet Twombly’s plausibility standard appears motivated by more than 
simply the desire to conserve costs. 131  The High Court viewed the 
plausibility standard as essential to a court’s ability to control the course and 
scope of litigation effectively.132 Justice Souter wrote: 
 
It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of a plausible 
entitlement to relief can, if groundless, be weeded out early 
in the discovery process through “careful case 
                                                 
 122  Id. 
 123  Id. (citing 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§1216, at 235–36 (3d ed. 2004)). 
 124  Id. at 556. 
 125  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.  
 126  See id.  
 127  Id. at 557. 
 128  See id. at 558. 
 129   Id. (quoting Ass’n Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 
528 n. 17 (1983)). 
 130  Id. at 559 
 131  See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558–59. 
 132  See id. 
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management,” given the common lament that the success of 
judicial supervision in checking discovery abuse has been on 
the modest side.   And it is self-evident that the problem of 
discovery abuse cannot be solved by “careful scrutiny of 
evidence at the summary judgment stage,” much less “lucid 
instructions to juries,”  the threat of discovery expense will 
push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases 
before reaching those proceedings.133 
 
Hence, the plausibility standard recognizes, especially in large and 
complicated cases, the need for pleadings to define the issues so that judges 
and lawyers can perform their jobs effectively and efficiently.134 
 After imposing the plausibility standard, the High Court observed 
that “a good many judges and commentators have balked at taking the literal 
terms of the Conley passage as a pleading standard.”135 It then retired the “no 
set of facts rule,” stating that “[t]he phrase is best forgotten as an incomplete, 
negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard: once a claim has been 
stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent 
with the allegations in the complaint.”136 Twombly held that the Conley rule 
actually “described the breadth of opportunity to prove what an adequate 
complaint claims, not the minimum standard of adequate pleading to govern 
a complaint’s survival.”137 
 Thus, Twombly understands the term “claim” narrowly and is a 
landmark decision for at least three reasons.138 First, it requires pleaders to 
support claims for relief with factual substance in addition to providing 
formal notice of the legal theories advanced.139 Second, it requires pleaders 
to do more than state legal conclusions or recite a claim’s elements by 
alleging facts, taken as true, which plausibly suggest wrongdoing under one 
or more legal theories.140 Third, claims failing to allege plausible facts are 
subject to dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), thereby enabling courts to 
control discovery costs, particularly in large, class-action cases.141 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 133  Id. at 559 (citations omitted). 
 134  See id. 
 135  Id. at 562 (citations omitted). 
 136  Id. at 563. 
 137  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563. 
 138  See infra text accompanying notes 139–141 (stating the three reasons that make 
Twombly a landmark case). 
 139  See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 
 140  See id. at 556. 
 141  See id. at 555–58. 
15
Darsow: Bahr-Hebert-Franklin Paradox
Published by DigitalCommons@Hamline, 2013
452 HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:3 
 
B. Twombly Raised Interesting Issues While Transforming the Landscape 
of Federal Pleading Practice. 
 
 Although Twombly transformed the landscape of federal pleading 
practice by construing the word “claim” as used in Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) 
narrowly, it also raised some interesting questions.142 Did Twombly signal a 
return to code pleading?143 The High Court evidently did not think so.144 
During the very same term it also decided Erickson v. Pardus.145 That case 
involved a pro se inmate’s § 1983 claim alleging that Colorado state prison 
officials violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and 
unusual punishment when they commenced, then wrongfully terminated, 
medical treatment for hepatitis C.146 The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit deemed these allegations “conclusory” under Twombly and 
affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Erickson’s complaint. 147  The 
Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit, noting that Rule 8(a)(2) merely 
requires a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader’s 
entitlement to relief and that the pleading of specific facts is unnecessary.148 
The complaint alleged that a prison doctor’s decision to remove Erickson 
from prescribed hepatitis C medication was endangering his life.149 “This 
alone,” held the Court, “was enough to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2).”150 
 Does Twombly’s plausibility standard apply to claims for relief made 
by pro se parties? 151  In Erickson the High Court observed that pro se 
complaints, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent 
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” 152  It also quoted 
Twombly and Conley, saying that Rule 8(a)(2) requires the pleader to “give 
the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which 
it rests.”153 Although the High Court does not say it expressly in Erickson, 
“fair notice” in the post-Twombly world requires the complaint to contain 
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”154 It 
logically follows that a pro se complaint also must comply with Twombly’s 
plausibility standard, even though federal courts will apply the standard to 
pro se parties deferentially.155 
                                                 
 142  Id.  
 143  See id. 
 144  See id.; Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). 
 145  Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (per curiam). 
 146  Id. at 89–90. 
 147  Id. at 90. 
 148  Id. at 93. 
 149  Id. at 94. 
 150  Id.  
 151  See infra text accompanying notes 152–155 (explaining why the Twombly 
standard applies to pro se parties). 
 152  Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). 
 153  Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). 
 154  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (1955). 
 155  Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). 
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 After Twombly, it was unclear whether the plausibility standard 
would apply to all civil cases, just complex cases involving burdensome 
discovery, or just antitrust cases.156 Also unclear was the degree to which the 
plausibility standard affected a pleader’s obligation under Rule 8(a)(2).157 
The United States Supreme Court addressed these questions directly and 
indirectly two years later in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.158 
 
C. Iqbal Addressed the Issues Twombly Raised by Applying the 
Plausibility Standard to All Civil Cases in Federal Court. 
  
 Iqbal arose from a Bivens action against numerous federal officials, 
including John Ashcroft, the former Attorney General of the United States, 
and Robert Mueller, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(“FBI”).159 Javaid Iqbal, a Muslim Pakistani citizen, claimed the government 
deprived him of various constitutional protections afforded by the First and 
Fifth Amendments during his detention as a person of high interest under 
harsh conditions at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn following 
the September 11 terrorist attacks.160 He alleged that the FBI arrested and 
detained thousands of Arab Muslim men as part of its investigation into 
those attacks during the ensuing months.161 The complaint alleged that many 
of those men, including Iqbal, were designated as persons of high interest 
solely because of their race, religion, and national origin.162 According to the 
complaint, Ashcroft and Mueller approved a policy of holding these 
detainees in highly restrictive conditions until the FBI cleared them of 
involvement in terrorism.163 Iqbal claimed that prison staff subjected him to 
inhumane living conditions, failed to provide him with adequate food, 
brutally beat him on two occasions, denied him medical care, and subjected 
him to daily strip and body-cavity searches.164 He also claimed that prison 
staff interfered with his prayers, confiscated his Koran, and refused to allow 
him to attend Friday prayer services.165 
 The defendants filed motions to dismiss on a variety of grounds, 
including qualified immunity.166  Their qualified immunity arguments fell 
into four broad categories: (1) the plaintiffs failed to allege violations of a 
clearly established right, (2) the plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient personal 
                                                 
 156  See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544. 
 157  See id.  
 158  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 159  See Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04 CV 01809, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21434, 
at *4–5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005). 
 160  See Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 147–49 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 161  Id. at 148. 
 162  Id. 
 163  Id. 
 164  Id. at 148–49. 
 165  Id. at 149. 
 166  Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 150. 
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involvement by the defendants in the challenged actions, (3) the plaintiffs’ 
allegations were too conclusory to overcome a qualified immunity defense, 
and (4) the defendants’ actions were objectively reasonable.167 The United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied most of the 
motions to dismiss, including those made on qualified immunity grounds.168 
The defendants appealed from that decision on an interlocutory basis.169 
 On appeal before the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, the parties disputed the extent to which a plaintiff must plead 
specific facts to overcome a qualified immunity defense at the motion-to-
dismiss stage.170 After discussing four Supreme Court cases it characterized 
as providing “not readily harmonized” guidance, 171  the Second Circuit 
observed that Twombly created “[c]onsiderable uncertainty concerning the 
standard for assessing the adequacy of pleadings . . . .”172 It noted that some 
statements in Twombly suggested that a new and heightened pleading 
standard be applied universally while other statements suggested that 
Twombly’s holding had a more limited application.173 Ultimately, the Second 
Circuit determined that Twombly did not require a universal, heightened 
pleading standard but “a flexible ‘plausibility standard,’ which obligates a 
pleader to amplify a claim with some factual allegations in those contexts 
where such amplification is needed to render the claim plausible.”174 After 
conducting a detailed analysis of Iqbal’s various claims under this “flexible” 
standard, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the 
defendants’ motions to dismiss with limited exception. 175  In a separate 
concurring opinion, the Honorable Jose A. Cabranes invited the Supreme 
Court at the earliest opportunity to reconsider some of its “less than crystal 
clear” precedent concerning pleading.176 
 The High Court accepted that invitation by accepting review of the 
case and using it as an opportunity to reverse the Second Circuit.177 Justice 
Kennedy, writing for the majority, noted that a Bivens action within the 
context of First and Fifth Amendment violations requires a plaintiff to plead 
and prove that the defendant acted with a discriminatory purpose.178 The 
Court noted that such purposeful discrimination “requires more than ‘intent 
                                                 
 167  Id. at 151. 
 168  See id. at 151–52. 
 169  Id. at 147. 
 170  Id. at 153. 
 171  Id. at 153–54. 
 172  Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 155. 
 173  See id. at 155–57. 
 174  Id. at 157–58. 
 175  Id. at 177–78. 
 176  See id. at 178–79. 
 177  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 687 (2009).  
 178  Id. at 676 (citing Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 
540–41 (1993); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976)). 
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as volition or intent as awareness of consequences.’”179 Rather, it requires 
pleading and proof that an official took “a course of action ‘because of’, not 
merely ‘in spite of’, [the action’s] adverse effects upon an identifiable 
group.180 The Court reasoned that,  
 
to state a claim based on a violation of a clearly established 
right, [Iqbal had to] plead sufficient factual matter to show 
that [officials] adopted and implemented the detention 
policies at issue not for a neutral, investigative reason but for 
the purpose of discriminating on account of race, religion, or 
national origin.181 
 
 Turning to Iqbal’s complaint, the Court observed that Twombly 
required courts to employ a “two-pronged approach” when deciding whether 
a complaint fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted.182 First, 
although courts must accept as true all facts alleged, legal conclusions are not 
entitled to the presumption of truth. 183  Legal conclusions include 
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which Twombly 
referred to as “legal conclusion couched as a factional allegation.”184 Second, 
the pleaded facts must permit the court to infer more than the mere 
possibility of misconduct. 185  Although the determination of whether a 
complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task 
requiring a court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense, the 
facts alleged must show the pleader is entitled to the relief sought.186 
 The Court then demonstrated how this two-pronged approach 
operated when applied to Iqbal’s complaint.187 It began by identifying and 
isolating the allegations that amounted to mere legal conclusions.188  The 
Court observed: 
 
Respondent pleads that petitioners “knew of, condoned, and 
willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [him]” to harsh 
conditions of confinement “as a matter of policy, solely on 
account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for 
no legitimate penological interest.” The complaint alleges 
that Ashcroft was the “principal architect” of this invidious 
                                                 
 179  Id. (citing Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)).  
 180  Id. at 676–77 (alteration in original) (citing Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279). 
 181  Id. at 677. 
 182  See id. at 679.  
 183  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 
 184  Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (1955)). 
 185  Id. at 678–79. 
 186  Id. at 679. 
 187  Id. at 680–84. 
 188  Id. at 680–81. 
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policy, and that Mueller was “instrumental” in adopting and 
executing it.189 
 
The Court went on to hold that “[t]hese bare assertions amount to nothing 
more than a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements’ of a constitutional 
discrimination claim . . . .” because they merely accused federal officials of 
adopting a policy because of its discriminatory effect upon an identifiable 
group of people.190 
 Having identified and isolated the complaint’s conclusory 
allegations, the Court next considered whether the remaining factual 
allegations stated a plausible claim for relief.191 What remained were Iqbal’s 
allegations that FBI Director Mueller directed, and Attorney General 
Ashcroft approved the arrest and detention of thousands of Arab Muslim 
men as part of the government’s September 11 investigation and that 
authorities held these detainees in highly restrictive conditions until cleared 
of wrongdoing. 192  The Court held that, although these allegations were 
consistent with a claim for purposeful discrimination, they did not plausibly 
establish that government officials acted with such a purpose.193 Given the 
fact that nineteen Arab Muslim hijackers perpetrated the September 11 
attacks, the Court reasoned that “[i]t should come as no surprise that a 
legitimate policy directing law enforcement to arrest and detain individuals 
because of their suspected link to the attacks would produce a disparate, 
incidental impact on Arab Muslims, even though the purpose of the policy 
was to target neither Arabs nor Muslims.”194 It was just as likely, said the 
Court, that Ashcroft and Mueller oversaw a policy that was both lawful and 
justified by arresting and detaining persons having potential connections to 
the September 11 terrorists.195 
 The Court further noted that Iqbal would not be entitled to relief 
even if one could plausibly infer from the alleged facts that unconstitutional 
discrimination led to his arrest. 196  The complaint did not challenge the 
constitutionality of Iqbal’s arrest or detention in the MDC.197 Iqbal claimed 
that government officials violated his constitutional rights by implementing a 
policy of holding him and other “high interest” detainees. 198  Yet the 
complaint contained no factual allegations showing that government officials 
purposefully housed detainees due to their race, religion, and national 
                                                 
 189  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680–81 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
 190  Id. at 681 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (1955)). 
 191  Id.  
 192  Id. 
 193  Id. 
 194  Id. at 682. 
 195  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682. 
 196  Id. 
 197  Id.  
 198  Id. 
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origin. 199  “All it plausibly suggest[ed] [was] that the Nation’s top law 
enforcement officers, in the aftermath of a devastating terrorist attack, sought 
to keep suspected terrorists in the most secure conditions available until the 
suspects could be cleared of terrorist activity.”200 The Court held that, under 
these circumstances, the complaint did not comply with Rule 8 because the 
facts alleged failed to comply with the requirement that a pleader state facts 
showing entitlement to relief.201 
 Iqbal not only applies Twombly to Bivens actions involving qualified 
immunity defenses, it is a landmark decision in its own right for at least three 
reasons.202  First, Iqbal rejected the argument that Twombly is limited to 
pleadings involving antitrust claims. 203  The High Court emphasized that 
Twombly “was based on our interpretation and application of Rule 8.”204 As 
such, Twombly “governs the pleading standard ‘in all civil actions and 
proceedings in the United States district courts.’”205 Because the plausibility 
standard applies universally to all claims for relief within federal civil 
litigation, one can fairly infer that Twombly does not apply only to complex 
cases where the anticipated discovery costs are high. After Iqbal, lower 
courts also held that the plausibility standard applies even to pro se parties, 
although their pleadings receive more deferential treatment than those 
drafted by lawyers.206 
 Second, Iqbal reemphasizes that motions to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim do not turn on what facts the claimant might uncover through 
discovery. 207  This statement is especially true in the qualified immunity 
context, where the doctrine’s basic thrust “is to free officials from the 
concerns of litigation, including ‘avoidance of disruptive discovery.’” 208 
Nevertheless, no claim deficient under Rule 8 is entitled to reach the 
discovery phase.209 
 Third, although Rule 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
permits pleaders to allege some matters generally, such as discriminatory 
intent, it “does not give him license to evade the less rigid — though still 
                                                 
 199  Id. 
 200  Id. at 683. 
 201  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 683. 
 202  Id. at 684; See also infra text accompanying notes 203–211 (stating why Iqbal 
is a landmark decision). 
 203  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684. 
 204  Id. 
 205  Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1). 
 206  See, e.g., Ventura-Vera v. Dewitt, No. 11-1130, 417 Fed.Appx. 591, 592 (8th 
Cir. June 7, 2011) (per curiam); Williams v. Dept. of Corr., No. 11 Civ. 1515 (SAS), 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100803, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2011); Smith v. Virginia, No. 3:08cv800, 
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60828, at *6 (E.D. Va. July 16, 2009) (citing Giarratano v. Johnson, 
521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5 (4th Cir. 2008); Thigpen v. McDonnell, No. 06-7719, 273 Fed.Appx. 
271, 273 (4th Cir. 2008)). 
 207  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684–85. 
 208  Id. at 685 (quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991)). 
 209  Id. at 685–86. 
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operative — strictures of Rule 8.”210 Because Rule 8 requires a pleader to 
allege facts showing entitlement to relief, it does not follow that the pleader 
may simply “plead the bare elements of his cause of action, affix the label 
‘general allegation,’ and expect his complaint to survive a motion to 
dismiss.”211 The pleading must allege sufficient factual matter, accepted as 
true, showing the pleader’s entitlement to the relief sought.212 The fact that 
one may plead certain matters in general terms does not absolve the pleader 
of the need to allege facts suggestive of wrongdoing in accordance with the 
theories alleged.213 
 
D. By Understanding a “Claim” for Relief Narrowly, the Plausibility 
Standard Makes Rule 12 Motions an Integral Part of Federal Civil 
Procedure. 
 
 The plausibility standard has altered the landscape of federal 
pleading practice by changing the understanding of a “claim” for relief under 
Rule 8.214 Twombly’s retirement of Conley’s “no set of facts” rule shows that 
federal courts now view a “claim” for relief narrowly.215 Hence, in federal 
court, a complaint consisting of conclusory statements married to legal 
theories will not survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.216 
Stating an actionable claim for relief in federal court now requires the 
pleader to state operative facts suggesting one or more legal theories.217 
 Yet the plausibility standard really is part of a larger shift in the way 
federal courts view dispositive motion practice.218 That shift began in 1986, 
when the Supreme Court of the United States decided the Celotex trilogy, 
which altered the way lower courts viewed summary judgment as a means 
for disposing of litigation.219 In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, the United States 
Supreme Court made the following observation about summary judgment 
procedure under the federal rules: 
 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have for almost 50 
years authorized motions for summary judgment upon 
proper showings of the lack of a genuine, triable issue of 
material fact. Summary judgment procedure is properly 
regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather 
                                                 
 210  Id. at 686–87. 
 211  Id. at 687. 
 212  See id.  
 213  See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 687–88. 
 214  Compare Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561–63 (2007) with 
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957). 
 215  See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561–63. 
 216  See id. at 555–56; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009). 
 217  See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56. 
 218  See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327–28 (1986). 
 219  Id. 
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as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are 
designed “to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive 
determination of every action.”220 
 
According to Celotex, federal district courts should have no inherent 
predisposition against summary judgment motions.221  Summary judgment 
procedure simply is a mechanism allowing the district courts to dismiss cases 
without a trial when the undisputed material facts adduced through discovery 
fail to support one or more essential elements of a claim for relief.222 
 The plausibility standard now allows one to make a similar point 
about dispositive motion practice challenging the legal sufficiency of 
pleadings to state claims.223 For over fifty years the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure have authorized motions for judgment on the pleadings upon a 
proper showing that the complaint fails to state a claim for which relief can 
be granted.224 That circumstance exists when the complaint fails to contain 
sufficient factual matter, taken as true, stating a plausible claim for relief.225 
When evaluating a pleading’s sufficiency to state a claim, the court’s focus is 
not on whether the pleader ultimately can establish liability under the legal 
theories alleged.226 Nor does the court’s determination necessarily hinge on 
the number and detail of facts alleged.227 Rather, the inquiry is whether the 
factual matter alleged is legally sufficient to suggest wrongdoing consistent 
with the stated legal theories. 228  The plausibility standard ensures that 
motions challenging the legal sufficiency of pleadings to state claims also are 
properly regarded, not as disfavored procedural shortcuts, but rather as 
integral parts of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed “to secure 
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.”229 
 Thus, the plausibility standard lends a thematic harmony to the 
manner in which federal courts interpret the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
in the area of dispositive motion practice.230  Summary judgment procedure 
under Rule 56(c) challenges the non-moving party’s entitlement to a trial by 
testing the legal sufficiency of the non-moving party’s evidence to establish 
the essential elements of the claim. 231  A party lacking evidence legally 
                                                 
 220  Id. at 327 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1). 
 221  See id. 
 222  See id. 
 223  Here we have in mind motions made pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) and 
12(c). 
 224  See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) and 12(c). 
 225  See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) and 12(c). 
 226  See FED. R. CIV. P. 8. 
 227  See FED. R. CIV. P. 8. 
 228  See FED. R. CIV. P. 8. 
 229  FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 230  See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c); FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); infra 
text accompanying notes 231–234. 
 231  See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). 
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sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact is not entitled to a trial of 
the claim.232  Dispositive motion practice under Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(c) 
challenges a pleader’s entitlement to discovery by testing the legal 
sufficiency of factual allegations to state a plausible claim for relief.233 Just 
as a lack of admissible evidence relative to a claim’s essential elements 
entitles the moving party to summary judgment, the lack of legally sufficient 
factual matter indicative of a claim’s essential elements entitles the moving 
party to dismissal for failure to state a claim.234 Therefore, the plausibility 
standard, properly understood and applied, yields results consistent with the 
overall purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.235 
 
IV. THE BAHR-HEBERT-FRANKLIN PARADOX IS AN 
UNNECESSARY PROBLEM THAT THE PLAUSIBILITY 
STANDARD CAN SOLVE IF PROPERLY UNDERSTOOD AND 
APPLIED 
  
 The Bahr-Hebert-Franklin paradox exists because the pleading rules 
stated in those cases test the sufficiency of pleadings under conflicting 
standards.236 Like the Conley rule, the Franklin rule, literally read, makes a 
complaint’s sufficiency to state a claim depend upon what the plaintiff might 
be able to prove, something that only the discovery process can determine.237  
The prohibition against pleading by legal conclusion, as stated in Bahr and 
Hebert, makes the complaint’s success or failure depend on the legal 
sufficiency of the facts alleged.238 Twombly’s plausibility standard solves the 
paradox acceptably, provided that lawyers and judges properly understand, 
use, and apply it in a practical way that effectuates the purpose of modern 
civil procedure related to pleading standards.239 
 
A. Hebert Created a Paradox in Minnesota’s Pleading and Rule 12.02(e) 
Jurisprudence by Tacitly Applying the Plausibility Standard Without 
Discussing Its Impact on the Franklin Rule 
  
 The Minnesota Supreme Court first cited Twombly in Hebert, a 
declaratory judgment action wherein landowners sought equitable relief in 
the form of ejectment and trespass damages against the City of Fifty 
                                                 
 232  See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 233  See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c). 
 234  See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c). 
 235  See FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 236  See infra Part IV.A; see infra Part IV.B; see infra Part IV.C (discussing the 
Bahr-Hebert-Franklin paradox). 
 237  N. States Power Co. v. Franklin, 122 N.W.2d 26, 29 (Minn. 1963). 
 238  See Bahr v. Capella Univ., 788 N.W.2d 76, 80 (Minn. 2010); Hebert v. City of 
Fifty Lakes, 744 N.W.2d 226, 228 (Minn. 2008). 
 239  See infra Part IV.C (explaining how the plausibility standard solves the Bahr-
Hebert-Franklin paradox). 
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Lakes.240 The landowners alleged that the City constructed a gravel road in 
1971 that deviated from the sixty-six foot wide area dedicated as a public 
roadway on plat drawings recorded in 1954.241 They alleged that the City 
refused to remove the road from their property despite their demands.242 The 
complaint did not allege when the landowners demanded the City remove the 
road.243 Nevertheless, the landowners characterized the road construction as a 
“continuing trespass.” 244  The City moved to dismiss the landowners’ 
complaint pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e) for failure to state a claim 
for which relief could be granted.245 The district court granted the City’s 
motion. The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed and an appeal to the 
Minnesota Supreme Court followed.246 
 After stating the case’s facts, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
discussed the standard of review applicable to motions for dismissal for 
failure to state a claim.247 It articulated that standard without even invoking 
the Franklin rule, stating the following: 
 
When reviewing a case dismissed pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. 
P. 12.02(e) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be 
granted, the question before this court is whether the 
complaint sets forth a legally sufficient claim for relief. Our 
review is de novo. We are to “consider only the facts alleged 
in the complaint, accepting those facts as true and must 
construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving 
party,” the landowners in this case.248 
  
In articulating the applicable standard of review, the court focused entirely 
on the legal sufficiency of the factual matter alleged, not the landowners’ 
ultimate ability to prove their claims with evidence adduced through the 
discovery process. 249  This approach to Rule 12 motion practice subtly 
resembles Twombly, even though the court did not invoke Twombly when 
discussing the standard of review.250 
                                                 
 240  Hebert v. City of Fifty Lakes, 744 N.W.2d 226, 228 (Minn. 2008). 
 241  Id. 
 242  Id. 
 243  Id. 
 244  See id. at 233–34. 
 245  Id. at 228–29. 
 246  Hebert, 744 N.W.2d at 228. 
 247  Id. at 229. 
 248  Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Bodah v. Lakeville Motor 
Express, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 550, 553 (Minn. 2003)). 
 249  See id. 
 250  Compare Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007) with 
Hebert, 744 N.W.2d at 228. 
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 Hebert’s subtle resemblance to Twombly does not end with the 
standard of review.251 The court analyzed the landowners’ trespass claim in a 
manner that accords with Twombly. 252  It observed that whether the 
landowners’ trespass claim survived dismissal under Rule 12.02(e) depended 
upon the character of the trespass alleged.253 If the landowners alleged a 
permanent trespass, one stemming from the City’s 1971 road construction, 
then the six-year statute of limitations would bar the landowners’ claim.254 If, 
on the other hand, the landowners alleged a continuing trespass, a recurring 
intrusion onto their property, then the six-year statute of limitations could not 
bar the claim as a matter of law.255 The court looked only to the factual 
matter alleged in order to determine the true character of the trespass 
alleged.256 Citing a decision from the Third Circuit and Twombly, the court 
acknowledged: “We are not bound by legal conclusions stated in a complaint 
when determining whether the complaint survives a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim.”257 With this acknowledgment in mind, the court 
decided that the landowners alleged a continuing trespass, not because they 
characterized the trespass as such, but because the landowners had alleged 
that they unsuccessfully demanded that the City remove the road.258 Then, 
quoting Franklin, the court observed that the landowners’ allegation of an 
unsuccessful demand for removal of the road was legally sufficient to state a 
claim for continuing trespass because it signaled that “the landowner[s] 
‘consent[ed] to an entry upon the land’ and because of that consent, ‘the 
failure to remove the structures, rather than the original entry, characterize[d] 
the wrong and support[ed] [a] theory of continuing trespass.’” 259  
Accordingly, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided that the six-year statute 
of limitations did not bar the landowners’ continuing trespass claim based on 
the alleged facts.260 
 Despite its very Twombly-like legal analysis and its antecedent 
standard of review, Hebert never clarified, corrected, or explained the 
Franklin rule as the Supreme Court of the United States clarified, corrected, 
and explained the Conley rule.261 This omission is puzzling, given the court’s 
heavy reliance on Franklin’s rationale.262 Although the Franklin rule literally 
                                                 
 251  See Hebert, 744 N.W.2d at 233–36. 
 252  See id. 
 253  See id. at 233–34. 
 254  Id. 
 255  Id. 
 256  See id. at 234–35. 
 257  Hebert, 744 N.W.2d at 235 (citing Anspach v. City of Philadelphia, 503 F.3d 
256, 260 (3d Cir. 2007); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553–54 (2007)). 
 258  See id. at 235–36. 
 259  Id. at 236 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting N. States Power 
Co. v. Franklin, 122 N.W.2d 26, 30 (Minn. 1963)). 
 260  See id. at 236. 
 261  Compare Twombly, 550 U.S. at 543 with Hebert, 744 N.W.2d at 226. 
 262  See Hebert, 744 N.W.2d at 236. 
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states that “[a] claim is sufficient against a motion to dismiss based on Rule 
[12.02(e)] if it is possible on any evidence which might be produced, 
consistent with the pleader’s theory, to grant the relief demanded,”263 its 
disposition, as noted above, did not turn on the plaintiff’s characterization of 
the alleged wrong as a continuing trespass subject to evidence adduced in 
discovery. Rather, it turned on the factual matter the plaintiff had alleged, 
namely that she had unsuccessfully demanded removal of NSP’s 
transmission line towers, signaling that the alleged wrongdoing involved 
NSP’s continual refusal to terminate the trespass, not its construction of the 
transmission line towers. 264  It, therefore, is strange that the Minnesota 
Supreme Court did not borrow from Twombly to explain the Franklin rule as 
“describ[ing] the breadth of opportunity to prove what an adequate complaint 
claims, not the minimum standard of adequate pleading to govern a 
complaint’s survival.”265 
 In Hebert, the Minnesota Supreme Court essentially applied 
Twombly’s plausibility standard without expressly adopting that standard for 
pleading in Minnesota’s state courts.266 Franklin itself analyzed a trespass 
claim’s survival on a motion to dismiss based on the factual matter alleged as 
opposed to the mere legal conclusions assigned to the facts. 267  Yet the 
Franklin rule, read literally, permits a claim to survive a motion to dismiss 
even if premised on mere legal conclusions.268 Franklin also discussed how 
the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure liberalized pleading by citing First 
National Bank v. Olson, a case explaining that those rules had abolished the 
distinction between facts and legal conclusions and permitted pleading by 
way of broad conclusions rather than ultimate facts.269 Thus, Hebert presents 
a paradox because it applies a pleading standard at odds with the letter of the 
Franklin rule and the traditional, liberal understanding of notice pleading 
under the rules.270 
 
B. Bahr Perpetuated the Paradox Hebert Created in Minnesota’s Pleading 
and Rule 12.02(e) Jurisprudence. 
 
 The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Bahr merely 
perpetuated the paradox Hebert started. 271  Bahr involved a claim for 
retaliation discrimination under the Minnesota Human Rights Act 
                                                 
 263  Franklin, 122 N.W.2d at 29. 
 264  See id. at 30. 
 265  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563. 
 266  See Hebert, 744 N.W.2d at 235–36. 
 267  See Franklin, 122 N.W.2d at 30–31. 
 268  See id. at 29–31.  
 269  See id. at 29 n.2; First Nat’l Bank of Henning v. Olson, 74 N.W.2d 123, 129 
(Minn. 1955). 
 270  Compare Hebert, 744 N.W.2d at 228 with Franklin, 122 N.W.2d at 29. 
 271  See Bahr v. Capella Univ., 788 N.W.2d 76, 78 (Minn. 2010). 
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(“MHRA”). 272  Elen Bahr, a Caucasian woman, worked in Capella’s 
communications department and supervised L.A., an African-American 
employee.273 Bahr claimed that she was the victim of reprisal discrimination 
because she opposed Capella’s treatment of L.A., specifically the decision 
not to place L.A. on a formal performance improvement plan (“PIP”), which 
Bahr viewed as discriminatory to L.A. and other employees.274 The district 
court held that Bahr’s complaint failed to state a claim for which relief could 
be granted because Capella’s decision not to place L.A. on a PIP did not 
amount to an adverse employment action.275 The district court never reached 
the issue of whether Bahr had adequately pled a good faith, reasonable belief 
that Capella discriminated against L.A. by not placing her on a PIP.276 
 The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that Bahr’s 
complaint survived dismissal because she adequately alleged her own good 
faith, reasonable belief that Capella’s actions, which she opposed, violated 
the MHRA.277 The court of appeals noted that Bahr had alleged that Capella 
refused to implement a PIP for L.A. four times in an effort to help her 
improve her job performance despite allowing her to initiate PIPs for other 
employees. 278  The court also observed that Bahr alleged that Capella’s 
human resources department commented that L.A. had a racially-biased 
history with Capella and that it was concerned that initiating a PIP would 
prompt a lawsuit. 279  For these reasons, the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
concluded that Bahr adequately alleged objectively reasonable grounds 
supporting her subjective belief that Capella treated L.A. differently because 
of her race in violation of the MHRA.280 
 With regard to the applicable pleading standard, however, the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals viewed Twombly as having corrected the 
Franklin rule. 281  After reciting the Franklin rule, the court of appeals 
emphatically stated: 
 
[W]e are mindful that the United States Supreme Court has 
recently corrected this standard insofar as it suggests that the 
future introduction of evidence can substitute for an 
adequate statement of facts in the complaint; the statement 
of entitlement to relief must go beyond “labels and 
conclusions” or the “speculative” presentation of a claim.282 
                                                 
 272  Bahr v. Capella Univ., 788 N.W.2d 76, 78 (Minn. 2010). 
 273  Id. 
 274  Id. at 82. 
 275  Id. at 80. 
 276  Id. 
 277  Id.; Bahr v. Capella Univ., 765 N.W.2d 428, 438–39 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009). 
 278  Bahr, 765 N.W.2d at 437. 
 279  Id. 
 280  See id. at 439. 
 281  Id. at 436–37. 
 282  Id. (citations omitted). 
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The Minnesota Court of Appeals expressed the view that current pleading 
jurisprudence “demands that the complaint state ‘enough factual matter’ . . . 
to suggest, short of ‘probability,’ ‘plausible grounds’ for a claim—a pleading 
with ‘enough heft’ to show entitlement.”283 This statement virtually invited 
the Minnesota Supreme Court to adopt Twombly’s plausibility standard.284 
 Although the Minnesota Supreme Court accepted review, it did not 
accept the invitation to formally adopt the plausibility standard as 
Minnesota’s rule for pleading and deciding Rule 12.02(e) motions. 285  It 
reversed the court of appeals without commenting on whether it correctly 
interpreted Minnesota’s pleading and Rule 12 jurisprudence in light of 
Twombly.286 After setting forth the case’s facts and procedural background, 
the court recited the standard of review applicable to motions to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim in a way that illustrates the paradox Hebert created: 
 
We have said that “a pleading will be dismissed only if it 
appears to a certainty that no facts, which could be 
introduced consistent with the pleading, exist which would 
support granting the relief demanded.” N. States Power Co. 
v. Franklin, 265 Minn. 391, 395, 122 N.W.2d 26, 29 (1963). 
But a legal conclusion in the complaint is not binding on us. 
Herbert, 744 N.W.2d at 235. A plaintiff must provide more 
than labels and conclusions. See id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 
929 (2007)).287 
 
This recitation of the standard for reviewing a Rule 12.02(e) motion 
illustrates just how paradoxical Minnesota’s pleading jurisprudence has 
become.288 Literally read, the Franklin rule makes the success of a Rule 
12.02(e) motion depend on the potential existence of facts ultimately proven 
as opposed to the legal sufficiency of the facts actually alleged.289 Hebert 
says that pleading by legal conclusion fails to state an actionable claim for 
relief, and Twombly holds that a complaint consisting of nothing more than 
labels and conclusions will not suffice. 290  Clearly Hebert and Twombly 
conflict with a literal understanding of the Franklin rule, resulting in a 
                                                 
 283  Id. at 437 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556–57 (2007)).  
 284  See Bahr, 765 N.W.2d at 437. 
 285  See Bahr v. Capella Univ., 788 N.W.2d 76, 83–85 (Minn. 2010). 
 286  See id. 
 287  Id. at 80. 
 288  See id. 
 289  See N. States Power Co. v. Franklin, 122 N.W.2d 26, 29 (Minn. 1963). 
 290  See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Hebert v. City of 
Fifty Lakes, 744 N.W.2d 226, 235 (Minn. 2008). 
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paradox.291 Unfortunately, the Minnesota Supreme Court did not address this 
paradox in Bahr when discussing the standard of review.292 
 As it did in Hebert, the Minnesota Supreme Court then engaged in a 
Twombly-like analysis of Bahr’s complaint.293 The court said the following: 
 
Bahr alleges that she opposed “discriminatory employment 
practices.” But Bahr’s complaint indicates that there was 
ongoing communication between Bahr and Capella 
concerning L.A.’s performance issues. Bahr wanted to put 
L.A. on a formal PIP; Human Resources disagreed, 
instructed Bahr not to implement a formal PIP, and indicated 
that L.A. had a “history” at Capella that was racially based 
and Capella was concerned that L.A. might file a 
discrimination lawsuit.  The complaint states that Bahr told 
employees in Human Resources on four occasions that she 
believed Capella’s treatment of L.A. was unfair and 
discriminatory to L.A. and to other employees. On two 
occasions, Bahr stated that she was unwilling to engage in 
what she believed to be discriminatory treatment. Although 
the complaint makes vague references that Capella somehow 
discriminated against employees other than L.A., the 
underlying actions were only with respect to L.A. Bahr 
appears to allege that Capella discriminated against L.A. 
because Bahr was not allowed to put L.A. on a formal PIP 
and L.A.’s performance issues were handled differently 
because of L.A.’s race.294 
 
The court then noted that Capella did not contest whether Bahr acted in good 
faith but whether it was objectively reasonable for Bahr to believe Capella’s 
decision not to place L.A. on a PIP violated the MHRA.295 “Accordingly,” 
said the court, “the issue here concerns the objective component—was 
Bahr’s opposition based on a legal theory and facts that are plausible?”296 
The court ultimately reversed the court of appeals, determining that “no 
reasonable person could believe that Capella’s treatment of L.A. was 
forbidden by the MHRA because L.A. was not subjected to anything that 
could remotely be considered an adverse employment action.”297 Clearly, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court employed the plausibility standard when deciding 
                                                 
 291  See supra text accompanying notes 289–290 (discussing how the rulings in 
Hebert, Twombly, and Franklin create a paradox).  
 292  Bahr, 788 N.W.2d at 80–85. 
 293  Id. at 82. 
 294  Id. 
 295  Id. 
 296  Id. (emphasis added). 
 297  Id. at 84–85. 
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whether Bahr stated a legally sufficient claim for reprisal discrimination 
under the MHRA.298 
 As in Hebert, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Bahr essentially 
applied the plausibility standard to determine whether the complaint stated a 
claim for which relief could be granted.299 In Bahr, however, the court was 
blunt about what it was doing. Bahr implies but does not hold that Minnesota 
courts should use Twombly’s plausibility standard to judge the legal 
sufficiency of pleadings to state claims for relief.300 Unfortunately, Bahr does 
not repudiate a literal reading of the Franklin rule, nor does it explain how 
the Franklin rule, phrased in terms of the pleader’s ability to produce 
evidence, can continue as a viable interpretation of Rule 8.01 in light of 
Hebert and Bahr.301 
 
C. The Plausibility Standard, Properly Understood and Applied, 
Acceptably Solves the Paradox, Thereby Advancing the Purpose Behind 
the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure. 
  
 The Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure serve a virtual trinity of 
objectives. 302  According to Rule 1, the Rules “shall be construed and 
administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of 
every action.” 303  This requirement applies to procedural rules involving 
pleading and motions to dismiss no less than other procedural rules. 304 
Minnesota State courts should require a pleading standard that is neither too 
complicated for effective use by claimants nor so formalistic that it fosters 
abuse by defendants who use it to play a game of technicalities.305 Pleading a 
legally sufficient claim for relief should not require rocket science, especially 
in big cases involving astronomical numbers of relevant details.306 Moreover, 
it is impossible to require a claimant to know every last detail supporting a 
claim before commencing an action, and imposing such a requirement 
“improperly den[ies] the plaintiff the opportunity to prove [the] claim.”307 
                                                 
 298  See Bahr, 788 N.W.2d at 83–85. 
 299  See id. 
 300  See id. 
 301  See id.  
 302  See MINN. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 303  MINN. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 304  MINN. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 305  See 2 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 8.04 (3d ed. 
2006) (stating “[t]he intent of the liberal notice pleading system is to ensure that claims are 
determined on their merits rather than through missteps in pleading.”). 
 306  See Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 
F.3d 773, 779 (7th Cir. 2007) (discussing the intent and purposes behind liberal notice 
pleading under the federal rules and the impracticality of imposing formalized pleading 
requirements to large, complex cases). 
 307  Id. at 780 (citing Am. Nurses’ Assoc. v. Illinois, 783 F.3d 716, 723 (7th Cir. 
1986); Haroco, Inc. v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi., 747 F.2d 384, 404 (7th Cir. 1984), 
aff’d., 473 U.S. 606 (1985)). 
31
Darsow: Bahr-Hebert-Franklin Paradox
Published by DigitalCommons@Hamline, 2013
468 HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:3 
 
 Yet the rules also should not obligate parties to spend thousands, and 
in some cases millions, of dollars defending themselves against meritless 
claims that can never be proven because the factual matter alleged signals no 
reasonably founded hope that discovery will yield the required proof.308 A 
pleading standard that cares little or not at all about the legal sufficiency of a 
claim’s factual allegations would permit a plaintiff to waste the time and 
money of others, needlessly giving settlement value to a worthless claim.309 
Minnesota needs a pleading standard that avoids all of these abuses and 
shortcomings.310 
 The plausibility standard, properly understood and applied, solves 
the Bahr-Hebert-Franklin paradox in accordance with Minn. R. Civ. P. 8.01 
by making the success of a claim for relief depend upon the legal sufficiency 
of the pleading’s factual allegations themselves instead of evidence that 
discovery might produce. 311  It requires that claims for relief possess a 
minimal level of focus that gives the parties a better understanding of the 
claim and enhances the court’s ability to manage discovery issues.312 By 
describing the minimum requirement for legally sufficient pleading under 
Rule 8.01, the plausibility standard fits within the overall purpose of the 
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure and enhances the thematic harmony of 
those rules.313 
 Rule 8.01 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure requires every 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim to allege “a short and 
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . 
.”314 According to this rule’s plain language, it is the claimant’s “short and 
plain statement of the claim,” not evidence obtained through discovery, 
which must show the pleader’s entitlement to relief. 315  The required 
“showing” is not one of proof but of demonstration through alleged facts.316 
The claim’s factual matter, however alleged, must indicate or suggest the 
claimant’s entitlement to relief under the liability theories asserted.317  A 
claim that merely accuses another party of wrongdoing, without stating any 
factual matter describing the wrongful conduct, does not show or explain in 
any factual way why the pleader is entitled to the relief sought.318 As such, it 
                                                 
 308  See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005). 
 309  See id. 
 310  See supra text accompanying notes 305–309 (discussing the abuses and 
shortcomings of the current pleading standard). 
 311  See supra text accompanying notes 85–88 (discussing the pleading standard of 
evidence educed through discovery). 
 312  See supra text accompanying notes 85–88 (discussing the pleading standard of 
evidence educed through discovery). 
 313  See MINN. R. CIV. P. 1; supra text accompanying notes 303–312 (discussing 
how the plausibility standard comports with the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure). 
 314  MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.01 (emphasis added). 
 315  See MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.01. 
 316  See MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.01. 
 317  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.01. 
 318  See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.01. 
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fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted and should be dismissed 
pursuant to Rule 12.02(e).319 
 The juxtaposition of these rules tells us as the High Court recognized 
in Twombly that claims for relief which fail to contain legally sufficient facts 
supporting the liability theories asserted are not entitled to discovery. 320 
Hence, the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure themselves permit district 
courts to dispose of claims for relief which fail to allege factual matter 
supporting the liability theories asserted.321 This result is just because claims 
for relief that cannot show or demonstrate entitlement to relief through 
legally sufficient factual allegations do not comply with Rule 8.01 which 
requires substantive as well as procedural notice of the claims presented.322 
 Read and applied literally, the Franklin rule prevents Rule 12.02(e) 
from operating as designed by absolving the pleader of having to comply 
with the substantive notice obligation that Rule 8.01 imposes.323 By its literal 
terms, the Franklin rule makes the legal sufficiency of a claim for relief, as 
well as the success of a Rule 12.02(e) motion to dismiss, depend on facts 
proven from evidence obtained through discovery. 324  It is impossible to 
know at the pleading stage what facts the claimant might prove or what 
evidence the claimant might produce.325 Indeed, Franklin itself holds that 
proof problems “cannot be reached or resolved short of a motion for 
summary judgment or a trial.”326 A pleading standard premised on what the 
claimant ultimately can prove practically guarantees the failure of any Rule 
12.02(e) motion challenging the legal sufficiency of factual allegations to 
state valid claims for relief.327 Thus, the Franklin rule, literally understood 
and applied, actually prevents the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure from 
operating as designed and militates against the overarching goal of civil 
procedure: “the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
action.”328 
 The plausibility standard, on the other hand, acknowledges that Rule 
8.01 really means something when it requires the short and plain statement of 
the claim to show or demonstrate the pleader’s entitlement to relief.329 An 
                                                 
 319  See MINN. R. CIV. P. 12.02(e). 
 320  See supra text accompanying notes 121–141 (discussing the rule set out in 
Twombly). 
 321  See MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.01; MINN. R. CIV. P. 12.02(e). 
 322  See MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.01. 
 323  See supra text accompanying note 83 (stating the rule set out in Franklin). 
 324  See supra text accompanying notes 85–88 (expanding upon the rule set out in 
Franklin). 
 325  See supra text accompanying note 88 (showing the court acknowledged this in 
Franklin). 
 326  N. States Power Co. v. Franklin, 122 N.W.2d 26, 31 (Minn. 1963). 
 327  See supra text accompanying note 88 (discussing this rule as set out in 
Franklin). 
 328  MINN. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 329  See supra text accompanying notes 131–137 (explaining the plausibility 
standard). 
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example illustrates this point. Suppose a plaintiff named Smith interposes a 
complaint against Jones following an automobile accident by alleging: 
 
1. Plaintiff Smith is a citizen of the state of Minnesota 
and resides in the County of Hennepin. 
 
2. Defendant Jones is a citizen of the state of 
Minnesota and resides in the County of Ramsey. 
 
3. On December 20, 2011, a vehicle owned and 
operated by Defendant Jones collided with the vehicle 
owned and Operated by Plaintiff Smith. 
 
4. Defendant Jones was negligent. 
 
5. The collision caused severe and permanent bodily 
injury to Plaintiff Smith resulting in disability for 60 days or 
more. 
 
 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Smith prays for judgment 
against Defendant Jones in excess of $50,000, including 
reasonable costs, disbursements, and such other relief as the 
court deems equitable and just. 
 
This hypothetical complaint simply accuses Jones of negligence without 
adequately explaining in factual terms what made him negligent. Under the 
facts alleged (i.e., the two vehicles collided), it is possible that Jones’ vehicle 
collided with Smith’s vehicle because Jones failed to keep a careful look out, 
was driving too fast, or failed to yield a right of way. Yet under the same 
facts, it also is possible that Jones’ vehicle collided with Smith’s vehicle 
because Jones had an unexpected heart attack and died. In Minnesota, it is 
“the settled rule that the mere occasion of injury does not in itself support an 
inference of negligence.”330 The above hypothetical complaint simply alleges 
the mere occasion for injury without alleging factual matter providing a basis 
for accusing Jones of negligence. It alleges only a possible claim for relief, 
making it subject to dismissal under the plausibility standard.331 
 Yet the plausibility standard does not represent a return to common 
law or code pleading, nor should courts and lawyers treat it that way.332 
Twombly itself acknowledges that a complaint does not have to state 
                                                 
 330  Lenz v. Johnson, 122 N.W.2d 96, 99 (Minn. 1963). 
 331  See supra text accompanying notes 131–137 (explaining the plausibility 
standard). 
 332  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 
89, 89–94 (2007) (per curiam). 
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“detailed factual allegations” in order to survive a motion to dismiss.333 The 
High Court’s decision in Erickson, decided between Twombly and Iqbal, said 
nothing indicating that Twombly’s plausibility standard is a reversion to a 
more rigid, formalistic pleading style.334 Similarly, Iqbal acknowledges that 
Rule 8, which itself demands factual allegations showing entitlement to 
relief, “marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, 
code-pleading regime of a prior era . . . .”335 Thus, the High Court’s own 
statements clearly note that the plausibility standard does not signal a return 
to formalistic pleading practices of an earlier era.336 
 Opinions from various United States Circuit Courts of Appeal 
recognize this point and apply the plausibility standard accordingly.337 For 
example, the Eighth Circuit recognized that Iqbal and Twombly “did not 
abrogate the notice pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2),”338 and held that a 
plaintiff claiming employer’s liability under Missouri law could merely 
allege that he was the defendants’ employee without alleging specific facts 
indicative of the alleged employment relationship.339 Similarly, the Seventh 
Circuit held that all a plaintiff needed to do to state an actionable claim for 
unlawful discrimination in residential real estate transactions was to identify 
the type of discrimination that occurred and when it happened.340 It reached 
that conclusion by recognizing that the plausibility standard does not amount 
to “a sub rosa campaign to reinstate the old fact-pleading system called for 
by the Field Code or even more modern codes.”341 Within a year after the 
High Court decided Twombly, the Third Circuit disavowed the notion that 
claimants must plead elemental facts to state a viable claim for relief, noting 
that the plausibility standard simply requires the pleading of facts suggesting 
a claim’s required elements,342 and criticizing “an unduly crabbed reading of 
the complaint” as denying the plaintiff “the inferences to which her 
complaint is entitled.”343 In remanding the case for further proceedings, the 
Third Circuit directed the district court to provide the plaintiff with an 
opportunity to amend her complaint with respect to certain claims.344 
 Given the fact that a valid claim for relief needs only to suggest a 
claim’s required elements, the prior hypothetical complaint may be corrected 
                                                 
 333  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 
 334  See Erickson, 551 U.S. at 89–94.  
 335  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 
 336  See supra text accompanying notes 332–335 (explaining why the plausibility 
standard is not a return to previous pleading practices). 
 337  See Hamilton v. Palm, 621 F.3d 816, 817 (8th Cir. 2010); Swanson v. Citibank, 
N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 405 (7th Cir. 2010); Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234–35 
(3d Cir. 2008). 
 338  Hamilton, 621 F.3d at 817. 
 339  See id. at 818–19. 
 340  Swanson, 614 F.3d at 405. 
 341  Id. at 404. 
 342  See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234–35. 
 343  Id. at 237. 
 344  Id. at 246. 
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with minimal effort.345 Because the plausibility standard does not require 
particularized pleading except where the claim alleges fraud or mistake, 
correcting pleading deficiencies should be relatively easy in most cases 
under the plausibility standard. 346  For example, the prior hypothetical 
complaint could be corrected with minimal effort: 
 
1. Plaintiff Smith is a citizen of the state of Minnesota 
and resides in the County of Hennepin. 
 
2. Defendant Jones is a citizen of the state of 
Minnesota and resides in the County of Ramsey. 
 
3. On December 20, 2011, Defendant Jones 
negligently operated his motor vehicle so as to cause it to 
collide with a vehicle owned and operated by Plaintiff 
Smith. 
 
4. The collision caused severe and permanent bodily 
injury to Plaintiff Smith resulting in disability for 60 days or 
more. 
 
 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Smith prays for judgment 
against Defendant Jones in excess of $50,000, including 
reasonable costs, disbursements, and such other relief as the 
court deems equitable and just. 
 
Every negligence claim consists of four elements: duty, breach, causation, 
and damages.347 The foregoing allegations suggest that Jones owed a legal 
duty to Smith by alleging that Jones owned and operated a motor vehicle. 
They suggest a breach of that duty by alleging that Jones negligently 
operated his vehicle. While this allegation amounts to a mixed statement of 
law and fact, it is sufficient to alert Jones that Smith’s claim focuses on 
Jones’ lack of reasonable care in driving, even if the precise lack of care at 
issue can be determined only through discovery.348 Causation and damages 
are plainly alleged as factual conclusions. The ease with which a claimant 
can modify a claim to make it comply with the plausibility standard suggests 
                                                 
 345  See id. at 234–35. 
 346  See supra text accompanying notes 131–137 (explaining the plausibility 
standard). 
 347  Hudson v. Snyder Body, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 149, 157 (Minn. 1982). 
 348  The flexibility of allowing parties to plead mixed statements of law and fact is 
essential to efficient pleading, “otherwise pleadings would become intolerably prolix, and 
mere statements of the evidence.” Clark v. Chi., Milwaukee, & St. Paul Ry. Co., 9 N.W. 75, 
75 (Minn. 1881). The plausibility standard does not prohibit pleading allegations which 
amount to mixed statements of law and fact. See Hamilton v. Palm, 621 F.3d 716, 818–19 (8th 
Cir. 2010). 
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that courts should allow a claimant to defend against a Rule 12.02(e) motion 
by demonstrating the ability to cure the pleading deficiency through 
amendment.349 
 The plausibility standard also helps keep litigation costs in check by 
ensuring that only well-pled claims are subject to discovery.350 Under the 
Franklin rule’s literal application, claims for relief proceed to discovery even 
though they fail to comply with the requirement of Rule 8.01. 351  The 
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, like their federal counterpart, frame the 
scope of discovery in terms of the claims and defenses asserted in the 
action.352 The cost of discovery necessarily increases every time a claim that 
is not properly pled passes to the discovery phase.353 The discovery process, 
particularly with the advent of electronic discovery, becomes an 
unnecessarily time consuming and expensive excursion when the facts 
alleged fail to indicate that the claimant has any reasonably founded hope of 
obtaining relevant evidence through the use of discovery procedures.354 The 
plausibility standard enables courts and parties to maintain focused discovery 
while controlling the associated expenses.355 
 The plausibility standard also enhances a thematic harmony within 
the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure just as it does within the Federal 
Rules. 356  In 1997, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized the Celotex 
trilogy as “instructive” with respect to Minnesota’s summary judgment 
procedure.357 This recognition has prompted the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
three years later to recognize that summary judgment is “‘an integral part’ of 
civil procedure, not a ‘disfavored procedural shortcut,’ and is ‘designed to 
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.’”358 
In effect, Minnesota’s appellate courts, like the federal courts, have backed 
away from the notion that summary judgment is a disfavored procedural 
tool. 359  Rather in Minnesota courts, as in the federal courts, summary 
judgment simply is another procedural tool permitting the early disposal of 
claims lacking evidentiary support post-discovery. 360  The plausibility 
standard similarly would make Rule 12.02(e) an integral part of Minnesota’s 
civil procedure by enabling already over-burdened and underfunded district 
                                                 
 349  FED. R. CIV. P. 12.02(e). 
 350  See supra text accompanying notes 131–137 (explaining the plausibility 
standard). 
 351  See supra text accompanying note 83 (stating the rule set out in Franklin). 
 352  Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) with MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.02(a).  
 353  See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559–60 (2007). 
 354  See id. 
 355  See supra text accompanying notes 131–137 (explaining the plausibility 
standard). 
 356  See supra text accompanying notes 131–137 and 303–313. 
 357  See DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 70 (Minn. 1997). 
 358  Dixon v. Depositors Ins. Co., 619 N.W.2d 752, 757 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986)). 
 359  See id. 
 360  See id. 
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courts to dispose of claims unsupported by legally sufficient factual 
allegations.361 
 Therefore, the time has come for Minnesota formally to adopt 
Twombly’s plausibility standard as the pleading standard applicable to claims 
for relief in all civil actions brought in the State’s district courts.362 Having 
already applied the plausibility standard in Hebert and Bahr, it only seems 
logical that the Minnesota Supreme Court should retire the Franklin rule 
(though not its holding) as “an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted 
pleading standard: once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be 
supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the 
complaint.” 363  Accordingly, the Franklin rule, like the Conley rule, 
“describe[s] the breadth of opportunity to prove what an adequate complaint 
claims, not the minimum standard of adequate pleading to govern a 
complaint’s survival.”364 The Bahr-Hebert-Franklin paradox will continue to 
foster confusion about the requirement for adequate pleading in state civil 
actions until the Minnesota Supreme Court expressly adopts the plausibility 
standard.365 
 
D. Although the Plausibility Standard Acceptably Solves the Bahr-Hebert-
Franklin Paradox, Important Considerations Remain  
 
 At least two important considerations remain even if the Minnesota 
Supreme Court formally adopts the plausibility standard. 366  One 
consideration is whether the plausibility standard will result in an increased 
use of Rule 12.02(e) to dispose of claims.367 Underlying this consideration is 
the concern that an increase in Rule 12.02(e) motions will inundate an 
overburdened and underfunded district court system.368 In response to those 
pressures, a secondary concern is that district courts would overzealously 
apply the plausibility standard simply to clear dockets. 
 A recent Federal Judicial Center study conducted for the Judicial 
Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules indicates that this 
                                                 
 361  See MINN. R. CIV. P. 12.02(e); supra text accompanying notes 131–137 
(explaining the plausibility standard). 
 362  See supra text accompanying notes 346–361; supra infra text accompanying 
notes 363–365 (setting forth the reasons Minnesota should adopt Twombly’s plausibility 
standard). 
 363  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007). 
 364  Id. 
 365  See supra Part IV.A (explaining how Hebert created the Bahr-Hebert-Franklin 
paradox). 
 366  See infra text accompanying notes 367–379 (stating the important 
considerations remaining). 
 367  See supra text accompanying notes 356–361 (explaining the use of Rule 
12.02(e)). 
 368  See supra text accompanying notes 356–361 (explaining the use of Rule 
12.02(e)). 
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consideration may not be as profound as some might expect.369 That study 
“compared motion activity in 23 federal district courts in 2006 and 2010 and 
included an assessment of the outcome of motions in orders that do not 
appear in the computerized legal reference systems such as Westlaw.”370 It 
used statistical models “to control for such factors as differences in levels of 
motion activity in individual federal district courts and types of cases.”371 
The study found that the filing rate of motions to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim generally increased from 2006 to 2010.372 However, the rate at which 
courts granted motions to dismiss in general without leave to amend did not 
increase.373 Moreover, the study showed no increase from 2006 to 2010 in 
the rate at which motions to dismiss terminated cases.374 
 A second important consideration is whether courts should apply the 
plausibility standard to affirmative defenses. 375  The federal circuits, 
including the Eighth Circuit, have yet to decide that question.376 Presently 
that question divides the judges of the United States District Court for the 
District of Minnesota.377 Some of the judges have held that the plausibility 
standard does not apply to affirmative defenses.378 Others have taken the 
opposite view, holding that affirmative defenses also are subject to the 
plausibility standard.379 
 A careful review of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure indicates 
that the plausibility standard should not apply to affirmative defenses.380 As 
noted above, the plausibility standard derives from Rule 8.01, which requires 
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled 
                                                 
 369  See JOE S. CECIL, GEORGE W. CORT, MARGARET S. WILLIAMS & JARED J. 
BATAILLON, MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL: REPORT TO 
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES ( 2011), available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal.pdf/$file/motioniqbal.pdf. 
 370  CECIL ET AL., supra note 369, at 13. 
 371  Id. at 7. 
 372  Id. at 7–12. 
 373  Id. at 12–16. 
 374  Id. 
 375  See infra text accompanying notes 376–378 (discussing whether the court 
should apply the plausibility standard to affirmative defenses). 
 376  See infra notes 378–379 (showing that although federal circuits have yet to 
decide this question many district courts have). 
 377  See infra notes 378–379 and accompanying text (showing judges are divided 
on this issue). 
 378  See U.S. Bank, Nat’l Assoc., v. Educ. Loans, Inc., Civ. No. 11-1445 
(RHK/JJG), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131453, at *15–16 (D. Minn. Nov. 14, 2011) (holding 
that the plausibility standard does not apply to affirmative defenses); accord. Schlief v. Nu-
Source, Inc., Civ. No. 10-4477 (DWF/SER), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44446 at *22–25 (D. 
Minn. April 25, 2011); Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, 750 F.Supp.2d 1049, 1051 (D. 
Minn. 2010). 
 379  See Ahle v. Veracity Research Co., 738 F.Supp.2d 896, 924–25 (D. Minn. 
2010) (applying the plausibility standard to affirmative defenses); accord. Equal Emp’t 
Opportunity Comm’n v. Hibbing Taconite Co., 266 F.R.D. 260, 268 (D. Minn. 2009). 
 380  See MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.01. 
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to relief . . . .”381 Unlike its federal counterpart, Rule 8.01 specifically lists 
the kinds of pleadings setting forth a claim for relief as: “an original claim, 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim . . . .” 382  Rule 8.02, a 
completely separate rule, applies to general defenses.383 They need only be 
stated “in short and plain terms” and consist only of admissions, denials, or a 
lack of “knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth 
of an averment.”384 Rule 8.03 applies to affirmative defenses.385 But unlike 
Rule 8.01, neither Rule 8.02 nor 8.03 requires that any defense, be it general 
or affirmative, be accompanied by any short and plain statement showing the 
defendant’s entitlement to raise any defense.386 Moreover, defenses, be they 
general or affirmative, by definition do not state claims, i.e., an “aggregate of 
operative facts giving rise to a right enforceable by a court.”387 Rather, a 
defense merely is a “stated reason why the plaintiff or prosecutor has no 
valid case.”388 Although the defendant bears the burden of proof with respect 
to affirmative defenses, they really amount to pleas in avoidance, not claims 
of entitlement to relief or remedy.389 Accordingly, it would seem that the 
plausibility standard should not apply to affirmative defenses raised in an 
answer or other responsive pleading given the plain language of Minn. R. 
Civ. P. 8.390 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
  
 Minnesota’s pleading and Rule 12 jurisprudence presently states a 
paradox.391 The Franklin rule leads us to believe that almost any kind of 
factual allegations suffice to state a legally viable claim for relief because a 
Rule 12.02(e) motion’s success depends on what facts the plaintiff ultimately 
might prove.392 Hebert and Bahr, on the other hand, say that a complaint that 
merely alleges legal conclusions does not suffice, thereby conditioning the 
viability of a claim for relief on what the plaintiff has alleged, as opposed to 
what the plaintiff might prove. 393  Although Hebert and Bahr embrace 
Twombly’s analysis to varying degrees, neither expressly adopts Twombly’s 
plausibility standard, nor do those cases attempt to explain how the Franklin 
                                                 
 381  MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.01. 
 382  MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.01. 
 383  MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.02. 
 384  MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.02. 
 385  MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.03. 
 386  Compare MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.02 and MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.03 with MINN. R. CIV. P. 
8.01. 
 387  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 281 (9th ed. 2009). 
 388  Id. at 482. 
 389  See id.  
 390  See MINN. R. CIV. P. 8. 
 391  See supra Part IV (explaining the current Bahr-Hebert-Franklin paradox). 
 392  See supra Part IV.A (explaining the rule set out in Franklin). 
 393  See supra Part IV.A (discussing the Bahr-Hebert-Franklin paradox). 
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rule squares with Twombly’s analysis and the plausibility standard from 
which it flows.394 
 The time is ripe for the Minnesota Supreme Court to decide whether 
to accept the plausibility standard for evaluating whether claims for relief are 
properly pled. If adopted in Minnesota, the plausibility standard would 
acceptably solve the Bahr-Hebert-Franklin paradox.395 Consistent with Rule 
8.01, the standard would require district courts faced with Rule 12.02(e) 
motions to focus on the legal sufficiency of the factual matter alleged rather 
than what the claimant ultimately might prove through evidence adduced in 
discovery.396 The standard is flexible enough to allow claimants to plead 
claims easily and sufficiently structured to define the issues to be litigated in 
a way that controls discovery costs and contributes to efficient case 
management.397 Moreover, the plausibility standard enhances the thematic 
harmony of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure by making Rule 12 
motion practice an integral part of those Rules and allowing that procedure to 
function in a manner consistent with their purpose.398 Thus, it makes sense 
that the Minnesota Supreme Court should expressly adopt the plausibility 
standard as the rule for judging the legal sufficiency of claims for relief in 
Minnesota at its earliest opportunity.399 
 
                                                 
 394  See supra Part IV.A (discussing how Hebert created a paradox). 
 395  See supra Part IV.C (explaining how the plausibility standard solves the Bahr-
Hebert-Franklin paradox). 
 396  See supra Part IV.C (discussing the plausibility standard). 
 397  See supra Part IV.C (discussing the plausibility standard). 
 398  See supra Part IV.C (discussing how the plausibility standard comports with 
the purpose behind the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure). 
 399  See supra Part IV.C (explaining why the plausibility standard should be 
adopted).  
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